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1The Anticompetitive Impact of Patent Settlements
in the Pharmaceutical Industry:
The Need for Revisions to the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984
Claire G. Kunstling
I.
Introduction
Over the next four years, patents on innovator drugs1 with combined United States sales of almost twenty
billions dollars will expire.2 Once these patents expire, the manufacturers of these drugs will no longer enjoy
government protected market exclusivity. Generic drug companies3will be free to introduce their own versions
of the innovator drugs into the market. Because pharmacists usually are permitted to substitute lower-priced
generic versions for innovator drugs, and in some cases are even required to do so, the introduction of these
generic drugs will likely have quite an impact on the market.4 And, since generic companies typically charge
less for their version of the innovator drugs, entry by generic drug companies is likely to result in remarkable
1An “innovator” or “pioneer” drug is a drug that has patent protection for either its chemical formulation or its manufacturing
process, has gone through the extensive FDA approval process, and is marketed under a brand name. See Congressional
Budget Office Study, How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices and Returns in the
Pharmaceutical Industry (July 1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov [hereinafter CBO Study]. The terms “innovator”
and “pioneer” will be interchangeably in this paper.
2See Timothy J. Muris, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation (April 23, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/pharmtestimony.htm.
3A “generic” drug is a replica of an innovator drug that contains the same active ingredients as the innovator drug and that
the FDA judges to be comparable to the innovator drug in terms quality, strength, and therapeutic eﬀectiveness. If a generic
drug relies on a patent held by the innovator drug, the generic cannot receive FDA approval to enter the market until the patent
on the innovator has expired. See CBO Study, supra note 1.
4See Analysis to Aid Public Comment at 2, In the Matter of Schering-Plough Corp., Upsher-Smith Labs., and Amer-
ican Home Products Corp. (Feb. 19, 2002) (FTC Dkt. No. 9297) [hereinafter Schering Analysis], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/02/ahanalysis.htm. Many third-party payers of prescription drugs support the use of or even
demand the use of generic versions of innovator drugs thus further increasing the impact that generics have on the market. See
id.
2cost savings for consumers. While this phenomenon should beneﬁt both consumers and manufacturers of
generic drugs, manufacturers of innovator drugs could potentially see a signiﬁcant drop in proﬁts due to this
increased competition.
As innovator drug companies face the prospect of earning decreased proﬁts for many of their top sellers,
they have increasingly looked for new ways to extend the patent life on these drugs. One of the ways
that pioneer drug companies typically extend the patent life of their drugs is to take advantage of the
patent term extensions provided for under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984,
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. However, for companies that have already taken advantage
of all of the patent extension time for which they are eligible, generic entry seems inevitable. Increasingly,
however, companies are ﬁnding ways to exploit loopholes in the regulatory structure established by the
Hatch-Waxman Act in order to maintain their market exclusivity. In recent years, one of the primary ways
that pharmaceutical companies have manipulated the Hatch-Waxman Act’s regulatory structure is to enter
into patent settlements with generic companies who challenge their patents under provisions of the Act.
These settlements, which may end up blocking entry by all generics, not just the generic involved in the
patent litigation case, usually enable pioneer drug companies to extend market exclusivity beyond the patent
life of their drugs. While both the pioneer drug companies and the generic drug companies typically proﬁt
from these settlements, the loss of potential competition is frequently quite costly to consumers.
Many people attribute the United States’ position as the world leader in the pharmaceutical industry to the
innovation encouraged under the intellectual property laws and the competition fostered by the antitrust
regime.5 However, patent settlements have the potential to distort the incentives created by both of these
regimes and interfere with their proper functioning. Patent settlements within the pharmaceutical industry
have the potential to distort these incentives even more because of their interplay with certain provisions
5See David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 Food Drug L.J. 321, 324 (2000).
3in the Hatch-Waxman Act. Therefore, even though the settlement of litigation is generally favored in this
country, patent settlements within the pharmaceutical industry are generally not favorably looked upon by
policymakers or by law enforcement oﬃcials.
This paper will begin by brieﬂy examining the theories behind antitrust law and intellectual property law.
Then it will look at the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act and at how Congress tried to balance the
incentives underlying both of these regimes within those provisions. The paper will continue by looking
at the costs and beneﬁts of settlements, particularly patent settlements in the pharmaceutical industry.
The paper will then examine three cases ﬁled by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenging patent
settlements between pioneer drug companies and generic drug companies. Because of the impact that these
types of settlements may have on consumers, numerous proposals for reform of the Hatch-Waxman Act have
been made. The paper will conclude by addressing those proposals and oﬀering an analysis as to which
proposals are most likely to beneﬁt consumers in the long run.
4II.
The Relevant Background Law
A.
Intellectual Property Law
The primary purpose of the intellectual property laws is to promote innovation.6 One of the ways that the in-
tellectual property laws encourage innovation is by allowing inventors to obtain patents, which are essentially
government-protected monopolies over their inventions that last for seventeen years.7These government-
protected monopolies are essential to promoting innovation because of the large ﬁxed costs associated with
creating products and services based on intellectual property.8 In the absence of intellectual property laws,
competitors would decrease the inventor’s return on the investment by free riding on his ideas.9The result
of this free riding would be that many products that increase public welfare would never be able to enter
the market because the inventor could not aﬀord the large initial investment.10 Even though products and
6See U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property, §1.0 (Apr. 6, 1995) (noting that the goal of intellectual property law is to “provide incentives for inno-
vation and its dissemination and commercialization by establishing enforceable property rights for the creators of new and useful
products, more eﬃcient processes, and original works of expression.”), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines
/ipguide.htm. [hereinafter Guidelines]
7See 35 U.S.C. §154 (2001). The Second Circuit has noted that “the patent laws reward the inventor with a temporary
monopoly that insulates him from competitive exploitation of his patented art.” SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
8See Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at
the Heart of the New Economy, Prepared Remarks for the Antitrust, Technology, and Intellectual Property Conference (March
2, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/ ipf301.htm.
9See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, Presented to the American Law Institute-ABA Commission on
Continuing Professional Education (Sept. 14, 2000), available at http://www.ali-aba.org/ aliaba/Posner 101100.htm.
10See id.
5services based on intellectual property frequently require large initial investments, the marginal cost of cre-
ating additional copies of the invention is usually quite low in comparison.11In principle, the expected proﬁts
from sales of these additional copies of an invention while it is under patent warrant the risk the inventor
takes when making the initial investment. The value of patent protection, then, comes from the additional
returns that an inventor is able to make over and above the returns that he could make in the absence of
the patent.12Thus, the intellectual property laws encourage inventors to make the large initial investments
necessary for innovation by creating a government-protected monopoly and then allowing the patent holder
to recoup his investment by enforcing this monopoly against potential competitors.13 However, by protecting
economic proﬁts, the patent system sometimes does more than encourage innovation. In some cases, the
patent system also encourages harmful monopolistic behavior and collusive activities among competitors or
potential competitors.
Intellectual property protection is quite important to the pharmaceutical industry. In fact, in a survey of one
hundred United States ﬁrms in diﬀering industries, drug companies indicated that sixty-ﬁve percent of their
drugs would not have been developed or commercially introduced in the absence of patent protection.14One
of the primary reasons why intellectual property laws are important to the pharmaceutical industry is be-
cause the development of new drugs, like the development of most other products reliant upon intellectual
property, requires a large initial investment. According to a recent estimate by the Boston Consulting Group,
11See Pitofsky, supra note 8.
12See Jean Olson Lanjouw, Patent Protection in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation Estimations of Patent Value, 65
Rev. Econ. Stud. 671, 671 (1998).
13See Phillip Areeda and Louis Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, Cases 415 (Aspen Law and Business
5th ed. 1997).
14See Pharm. Research and Mfrs of Am., Pharmaceutical Industry Profile (2000) (citing C.E. Barﬁeld & C. Beltz.,
Balancing and Rebalancing the National Interest in the Patent System, Am. Enter. Inst. (October 1995)). This ﬁgure is
much higher than was reported by any other industry in the study. See id.
6the pre-tax cost of developing a drug introduced in 1990 was $500 million.15 A more recent study by the
Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development indicates that the cost of developing a new drug has risen
to about $802 million.16The industry as a whole is estimated to have allocated $26.4 billion, about 20.3%
of sales, to research and development in the year 2000.17 In an industry characterized by such large invest-
ments in research and development, the intellectual property laws are essential if drug companies are to earn
enough proﬁts to recoup their investments.
The large investments in research and development could, by themselves, have a chilling eﬀect on innovation,
but in the pharmaceutical industry the eﬀect is compounded by the long period of time that it takes to bring
a new drug to market. During the 1990’s, the average drug took almost ﬁfteen years to develop.18 During
these ﬁfteen years, companies were not able to realize any returns on their huge initial investment. To make
matters even worse, only three out of every ten new drugs introduced has economic returns that are higher
than their average after-tax research and development costs.19 Despite the high costs, delay in realizing
returns, and low chance of proﬁtability, once a successful drug is developed, it is usually relatively easy and
inexpensive to reproduce. 20This means that once a drug has actually been developed and is ready to be
marketed, it has the potential to be quite proﬁtable. Studies have estimated that for drugs introduced in
the early 1980’s, the earned returns exceeded the capitalized costs of development by $22 million to $36
15See id. (citing Boston Consulting Group, The Contribution of Pharmaceutical Companies: What’s at Stake
for America (September 1993)). This ﬁgure includes the cost of research failures and the interest costs over the period of
investment. See id.
16See Lewis Krauskopf, More Challenging Growth Goals Make Drug Mergers Likely, Experts Say, The Record (New
Jersey), Dec. 30, 2001.
17See Pharm. Research and Mfrs of Am., supra note 14 (citing J.A. DiMasi, New Drug Development: Cost, Risk, and
Complexity, Drug Information Journal (May 1995)).
18See id.
19See CBO Study, supra note 1.
20See id.
7million on average.21Thus, intellectual property protection is important to the pharmaceutical industry be-
cause it provides innovator drug manufacturers with a period of market exclusivity during which they are
able to earn these proﬁts. This period of market exclusivity allows the companies to recoup their large ini-
tial investments and generate the funds they need in order to do more research and development in the future.
B.
Antitrust Law
The primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote competition.22 There are numerous rationales as
to why it is necessary to protect competition. Some theorists believe that it is important to protect com-
petition because it can have positive eﬀects on economic eﬃciency and consumer welfare.23Others believe
that competition is beneﬁcial because it helps preserve opportunities for smaller ﬁrms.24Some subscribe to
the view that competition is beneﬁcial because it prevents unfair redistribution of wealth from consumers to
producers.25Many support some combination of these rationales. Regardless of the rationale to which they
subscribe, all those who enforce the antitrust laws are concerned with preventing unreasonable restraints
21See id. This ﬁgure is based on an estimate that manufacturers invest an average of about $200 million (in 1990 dollars) to
bring a new drug to market. The CBO estimates that since 1984, the expected level of returns from marketing a brand name
drug has dropped by twelve percent, or an average of twenty-seven million dollars. See id.
22See Areeda, supra note 13, at 415.
23See id.
24See id.
25See id.
8on trade that have the eﬀect of diminishing competition.26 There are several major antitrust provisions
that are relevant for the purposes of this paper. Brieﬂy, Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes all contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies that restrain trade illegal.27Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes the act of
monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, or conspiring to monopolize illegal.28Finally, Section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act makes unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
illegal.29When enforcing these laws, actual written agreements between competitors or potential competitors
often serve as red ﬂags to antitrust authorities. Two types of agreements prove to be particularly problem-
atic. The ﬁrst type are those under which parties agree not to compete along some important dimension
such as price, quality, or innovation, or in some particular geographic region or product market, or even
not to compete at all.30The second type are those in which parties work together to keep other competitors
from entering the market or from succeeding in the market by denying them access to a means of competing
in the market or by outright refusing to deal with them.31As will be discussed later in this paper, patent
settlements in the pharmaceutical industry are problematic for antitrust enforcers because they often take
the form of one or both of these types of anticompetitive agreements.
The protections provided to pharmaceutical companies by the antitrust laws are particularly important
because many of the same factors that inhibit innovation in the pharmaceutical industry also hinder compe-
tition in the pharmaceutical industry. One of the biggest impediments to competition in the pharmaceutical
26See Balto, supra note 5, at 326.
27See 15 U.S.C. §1 (2001).
28See 15 U.S.C. §2 (2001).
29See 15 U.S.C. §45 (2001). It should be noted that while the FTC Act covers a broader spectrum of activities than the
Sherman Act, it can only be enforced by the FTC.
30See Balto, supra note 5, at 327.
31See id.
9industry is the large amount of money needed for research and development.32Many potential entrants are
kept out of the market because they simply cannot raise the capital that is needed in order to successfully
discover, develop, manufacture, and seek approval with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for a
new drug. Another obstacle for potential competitors is the long amount of time required to complete the
development process.33Even if a potential entrant can raise initial capital, it may not be able to sustain itself
for the ﬁfteen years that it could take to see any sort of proﬁt on a new drug. Finally, patent protection
itself serves as a hurdle for potential entrants because depending on the patent, potential competitors may
be prevented from using a particular method of manufacturing or from using a discovery in the same manner
as the patent holder. Given the negative impact that these factors alone have on competition, the antitrust
laws are necessary to prevent the types of agreements and other anticompetitive practices that would serve
to further stiﬂe competition in the industry.
C.
The Tension Between Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law
In many ways, the intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws embody complementary principles.
At their core, both sets of laws are rooted in the fundamental public policy of beneﬁting society - the
intellectual property laws by promoting innovation and the antitrust laws by protecting competition.34Both
32See supra notes 15 - 17 and accompanying text.
33See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
34See Balto, supra note 5, at 415. As the Federal Circuit has noted, “[t]he aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws
may seem, at ﬁrst glance, wholly at odds. However, the two bodies of law are complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging
innovation, industry and competition.” Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876-77 (Fed. Cir. 1985))
10regimes acknowledge that the market does not operate perfectly and must be monitored in order to prevent
market abuses that can harm society.35Ultimately, the two sets of laws also are alike in that they recognize
that the behaviors they promote can be harmful to society and must be balanced with other interests.36
Despite these similarities, the intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws often come into conﬂict.
This conﬂict arises because the protection provided to inventors under the intellectual property laws may
prevent the types of competition that the antitrust laws try to protect.37Since patents give their holders
what essentially amounts to a government-protected monopoly, patents may harm competition by making
it diﬃcult for a potential competitor to enter the market without infringing on the patent.38Patents may
also stiﬂe competition by discouraging research into improved products that could beat out the competition
since improving a product without infringing a patent may be impossible.39 Because of these harmful eﬀects
on competition, many of the social costs of a monopoly that the antitrust laws seek to prevent, such as
reduced output, higher prices, and underutilization of knowledge, occur in markets dependent on patented
products.40
35See Balto, supra note 5, at 416.
36See id.
37According to the Second Circuit:
The conﬂict between the antitrust laws and patent laws arises in the methods they embrace that were designed to achieve
reciprocal goals. While the antitrust laws proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws reward the inventor
with a temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive exploitation of his patented art. When the patented product,
as is often the case, represents merely one of many products that eﬀectively compete in a given product market, few antitrust
problems arise. When, however, the patented product is so successful that it evolves into its own economic market, as was the
case here, or succeeds in engulﬁng a large section of a preexisting product market, the patent and antitrust laws necessarily
clash. In such cases the primary purpose of antitrust laws – to preserve competition – can be frustrated, albeit temporarily, by
a holder’s exercise of the patent’s exclusionary power during its term.
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
38See Areeda, supra note 13, at 151.
39See id. at 151.
40See id. at 150.
11In recent years, the federal antitrust authorities have increasingly addressed the conﬂict between the antitrust
laws and intellectual property laws. In 1995, the FTC and the Department of Justice jointly issued the
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property. The overall approach of these guidelines
embodies three general principles that should be kept in mind when addressing situations involving the
interplay between the antitrust laws and the intellectual property laws. First, antitrust enforcers should
apply the same antitrust principles to conduct involving intellectual property as they would to conduct
involving any other form of property.41The agencies recognize that intellectual property has certain important
characteristics that distinguish it from other types of property and take these diﬀerences into account in
cases involving intellectual property, however, the governing antitrust principles are the same.42Second,
the antitrust enforcers do not assume that intellectual property creates market power for the purposes of
antitrust analysis.43Even though intellectual property rights confer the right to exclude, there are often
other substitutes for the product that will diminish market power.44Even if intellectual property rights do
confer market power, that market power does not oﬀend the antitrust laws by itself.45Third, the antitrust
enforcers recognize that intellectual property licensing can be pro-competitive.46Licensing may expand access
to intellectual property and make the process of bringing new products to market more eﬃcient.47Thus,
despite the fact that the two sets of laws cannot be entirely reconciled, the agencies in charge of enforcing
the antitrust laws have provided some guidance for those trying to predict whether they will challenge as
41See Guidelines, supra note 6, at §2.1.
42See id.
43See id. at §2.2.
44See id.
45See id.
46See id. at §2.3.
47See id.
12anticompetitive a practice involving intellectual property.
Perhaps nowhere is the conﬂict between the intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws more evident
than in the pharmaceutical industry. Intellectual property law plays an important role in insuring that
pharmaceutical companies are able to aﬀord the research and development process that leads to beneﬁcial
new drugs for consumers and proﬁts for the drug companies. At the same time, as pharmaceutical costs
continue to rise, antitrust laws play an important role in insuring that pharmaceutical companies continue
to compete in terms of price and in terms of beneﬁcial new products. The challenge for lawmakers has been
to try and ﬁnd the proper balance in the pharmaceutical industry between the intellectual property laws
and the antitrust laws.
III.
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984
A.
Historical Context
The complex interplay between the antitrust laws and the intellectual property laws is even more compli-
cated in the pharmaceutical industry because of the regulatory scheme created under the Hatch-Waxman
Act. The Hatch-Waxman Act, was passed in response to several of the eﬀects that the 1962 Amendments to
13the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) had on the pharmaceutical industry. Before passage
of the 1962 Amendments, pharmaceutical manufacturers seeking FDA approval of a new drug only had to
prove that their drug was safe.48 However in response to the Thalidomide tragedy of 1961, Congress enacted
the 1962 Amendments which added the additional requirement that all new drugs also had to demonstrate
eﬀectiveness.49In order to obtain FDA approval under this new standard, pioneer drug companies had to
submit human test results demonstrating both safety and eﬀectiveness as a part of their New Drug Applica-
tions (NDAs).50The practical eﬀect of this additional requirement was a signiﬁcant increase in the scientiﬁc,
technical, and administrative burdens on pioneer drug manufacturers seeking FDA approval of a new drug
through an NDA.51 In addition to adding an eﬃcacy requirement for innovator drugs, the 1962 Amend-
ments also established alternative FDA approval procedures for certain generic drug manufacturers. Under
the 1962 Amendments, drug manufacturers seeking FDA approval for generic equivalents of pioneer drugs
which had been approved by the FDA prior to 1962 did not have to perform all of the human clinical tests
that are required for an NDA.52 Instead, generic drug manufacturers could submit an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) containing test results which demonstrated that the generic drug was the same as the
drug produced by the pioneer and contained assurances that the generic would be properly manufactured
and labeled.53The rationale behind the abbreviated procedure was twofold. First, the FDA viewed such
retesting as ineﬃcient and unnecessary since the pioneer drug had already been determined to be safe and
48See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 16 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2649. See also Gerald J. Mossinghoﬀ,
Striking the Right Balance Between Innovation and Drug Price Competition: Understanding the Hatch-Waxman Act: Overview
of Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 Food Drug L.J. 187, 187 (1999).
49See Mossinghoﬀ, supra note 48, at 187.
50See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), supra note 48, at 16.
51See Kleinfeld, Kaplan, & Becker, Human Drug Regulation: Comprehensiveness Breeds Complexity, in Food and Drug
Law 243, 245 (Richard M. Cooper ed., 1991).
52See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), supra note 48, at 16.
53See id.
14eﬀective.54Second, the FDA also felt that such retesting was unethical because it meant that a certain number
of sick patients would be given placebos, thus denying patients a treatment known to be eﬀective.55Despite
the fact that these rationales were equally applicable to post-1962 drugs, the 1962 Amendments made no
provision for an abbreviated approval process for generic versions of post-1962 drugs.
The 1962 Amendments sought to beneﬁt consumers by reducing the costs imposed on society by ineﬀective
drugs, but the additional burdens imposed by the amendments had two signiﬁcant, unintentional adverse
eﬀects on the pharmaceutical industry. First, the strict eﬃcacy requirements mandated by the 1962 Amend-
ments increased the amount of time it took for a drug manufacturer to get FDA approval.56Since drug
manufacturers usually obtain patent approval before submitting their NDA to the FDA, this longer approval
period led to a signiﬁcant loss of eﬀective patent life for pioneer drugs.57Second, because the 1962 Amend-
ments made it more diﬃcult to obtain approval of an NDA and because the ANDA procedure was only
applicable to pre-1962 drugs, the NDA requirements had the practical eﬀect of preserving market exclusiv-
ity for innovator drugs by stalling, and even preventing, the development of generic versions of post-1962
drugs.58In fact, at the time the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted, there were around 150 post-1962 drugs oﬀ
patent for which there were no generic equivalents.59
54See id.
55See id.
56See Allan M. Fox & Alan R. Bennett, The Legislative History of the Drug Price Competition and Restoration
Act of 1984 iii (Food and Drug Law Institute Series 1987). Currently, it takes an average of nine years to obtain FDA approval
to bring a new pioneer drug to market. See Robert Levy, Fed. Trade Comm’n., Bureau of Economics Staff Report,
The Pharmaceutical Industry: A Discussion of Competitive and Antitrust Issues in An Environment of Change
(Mar. 1999).
57See id.
58See id.
59See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), supra note 48, at 17.
15B.
Statutory Provisions
The Hatch-Waxman Act sought to deal with the unintended eﬀects of the 1962 Amendments by striking a
compromise between protection of the interests of the generic drug manufacturers and protection of those of
the innovator drug manufacturers. The purpose of the Act was twofold. Congress wanted “to make available
more low cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug approval procedure for pioneer drugs ﬁrst approved
after 1962” while at the same time “creat[ing] a new incentive for increased expenditures for research and
development of certain products which are subject to premarket government approval.”60Thus, from a policy
perspective, the Act was basically an attempt to balance the same goals as those embodied within the
antitrust laws and the intellectual property laws - fostering competition and encouraging innovation. By
including provisions that made the ANDA available to all generic drugs (not just those for pre-1962 drugs)
and by extending patent protection for innovator drugs, the drafters of the Hatch-Waxman Act hoped to
achieve balance between these goals.61
1.
The Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA)
The ﬁrst major change under the Hatch-Waxman Act was the extension of the Abbreviated New Drug
Application process to all generics so as to promote the development of generic versions of more innovator
60Id. at 15.
61See Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, Longer Patents for Lower Imitation Barriers: The 1984 Drug Act, 76 Am. Econ.
Rev. 195, 195 (1986).
16drugs. As previously discussed, prior to the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic versions of post-1962
drugs still had to duplicate all of the safety and eﬀectiveness tests conducted on the innovator drugs.62The
Hatch-Waxman Act did away with this distinction between generic versions of pre-1962 drugs and generic
versions of post-1962 drugs. Under Title I of the Hatch-Waxman Act, all generic manufacturers applying
for an ANDA can rely on the safety and eﬃcacy tests of the innovator manufacturer as long as they demon-
strate that the generic version contains the same active ingredients as the innovator drug, that the generic
is bioequivalent to the innovator drug, and that the product will be properly labeled.63 Bioequivalence tests
are much cheaper than the types of tests which are necessary in order to demonstrate safety and eﬃcacy;
therefore, this provision is extremely beneﬁcial to generic manufacturers.64 In order to receive FDA approval,
the ANDA ﬁler must also provide certiﬁcation with respect to each of the innovator drug’s patents listed
in the FDA’s Orange Book.65There are four diﬀerent types of certiﬁcation that a generic manufacturer can
make to the FDA. A “Paragraph I” certiﬁcation states that patent information for the innovator drug is not
in the Orange Book.66A “Paragraph II” certiﬁcation says that any patents for the innovator drug that are
listed in the Orange Book have expired.67A “Paragraph III” certiﬁcation provides the date that the innovator
drug’s patents will expire with the understanding that the ANDA will not receive ﬁnal approval until such
62See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
63See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (1999).
64See CBO Study, supra note 1.
65See 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(2)(A) (1999). As a part of the NDA ﬁling process, innovator drug companies must submit a signed
declaration listing the patent number and expiration date for all patents covering the drug or the method of use of the drug
for which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be claimed. See 21 U.S.C. §355(b)(1)(1999). The FDA then lists
all of these patents in a document called the Orange Book (oﬃcially entitled the “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations”). The FDA relies on the drug companies’ representations as to the validity of the patents rather
than making an independent determination as to the validity of the patents. See Elizabeth H. Dickinson, Symposium: Striking
the Right Balance Between Innovation and Drug Price Competition: Understanding the Hatch-Waxman Act: FDA’s Role in
Making Exclusivity Determinations, 54 Food Drug L.J. 195, 196 (1999).
66See id. §355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I).
67See id. §355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(II).
17date.68Finally, a “Paragraph IV” certiﬁcation makes the claim that the innovator drug’s patents are invalid
or will not be infringed by the applicant’s generic drug.69Generic manufacturers who ﬁle a Paragraph IV
certiﬁcation must notify the owner of each patent and the NDA holder for the innovator drug, as well as
submit a detailed statement of the factual and legal basis of the opinion that the patent is not valid or will
not be infringed.70 Upon receiving a Paragraph IV certiﬁcation, an innovator drug company has forty-ﬁve
days in which to initiate a patent infringement suit against the ANDA applicant.71If the innovator does not
bring suit, the FDA may begin the approval process. However, if the innovator does bring suit then the FDA
automatically stays approval of the application until the earliest of a ﬁnal determination that the patent has
not been infringed, the expiration of the patent, or the passage of thirty months from the innovator’s receipt
of notice of the Paragraph IV certiﬁcation.72Because the FDA relies on the assertions of the innovator drug
company with regard to the validity of its patents,73the Hatch-Waxman provides an additional incentive for
manufacturers to challenge the validity of an innovator’s patents. Under the Act, the ﬁrst ANDA ﬁler to
make a Paragraph IV certiﬁcation with respect to a particular innovator drug receives a period of market
exclusivity.74Subsequent generic versions of the innovator drug are not allowed to enter the market until
180 days from the earlier of the date of a court determination that the patent which is the subject of the
Paragraph IV certiﬁcation is either invalid or has not been infringed, or the date the FDA receives notice
68See id. §355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III).
69See id. §355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
70See id. §355(j)(2)(B)(i).
71See id. §355(j)(5)(B)(iii). Submission of a Paragraph IV certiﬁcation to the FDA constitutes patent infringement for the
purposes of federal court jurisdiction, thereby allowing the patent dispute to be resolved before the generic is marketed. See 35
U.S.C. §271(e)(2) (2001). See also Dickinson, supra note 63, at 198.
72See id. §355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
73See supra note 63.
74See 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1999).
18that the ﬁrst ANDA ﬁler has begun marketing the drug.75Thus, the ANDA provision balances the interests
of pioneer drug manufacturers and generic drug manufacturers by providing the owner of the patent with
what amounts to an automatic preliminary injunction of up to thirty months, while providing the generic
an abbreviated approval process and a six-month exclusivity period. The thirty-month stay helps preserve
the pioneers’ incentives to innovate while the ANDA process and the market exclusivity provides generics
with incentives to compete.
2.
Patent Extensions
In addition to extending the ANDA process to all generic drugs, the Hatch-Waxman Act also includes
important provisions relating to patents. The ﬁrst signiﬁcant patent provision in the Hatch-Waxman Act
establishes patent-term extensions for innovator drugs in order to preserve the incentives to innovate.76Prior
to the passage of Hatch-Waxman, an innovator drug had a patent term of seventeen years from the grant
of the patent.77However, because innovator drugs had to go through the FDA approval process, the average
length of time between when an innovator drug actually entered the market (and thus could proﬁt from
the drug) and when its patent expired was only nine years.78In an attempt to compensate innovator drug
75See id.
76Patent extensions were not the only way that Congress attempted to encourage innovation. Congress created a minimum
of ﬁve years of exclusivity even for those drugs which do not qualify for patent protection. During the ﬁrst ﬁve years of market
life for these drugs no ANDA can be submitted which refers to the unpatented drug. See 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(4)(D)(ii) (1999).
77See CBO Study, supra note 1.
78See id.
19manufacturers for the loss of patent life that resulted from the post-1962 lengthier FDA approval process,
the Hatch-Waxman Act provided innovator drug manufacturers with the ability to obtain a patent term
extension.79 In order to be considered for a patent extension, the innovator drug company must meet several
requirements. First, the patent in question must not have expired before the application for extension is
submitted.80Second, the patent in question must not previously have been extended.81Third, the owner of
record of the patent must submit a proper application for extension.82Fourth, the drug covered by the patent
must have been subject to a regulatory review period before its commercial marketing or use.83Fifth, the
approval of the drug must have led to the ﬁrst commercial marketing or use of the drug under applicable
law.84Finally, an application containing details about the patent and the actions taken in order to obtain
FDA approval must be submitted to the United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce within sixty days of
obtaining FDA approval for the drug.85 In general, the Hatch-Waxman Act allows patents to be extended
for a period equal to half the time the innovator drug spends in clinical tests after its patent is granted
plus all of the time the FDA spends reviewing the NDA for the innovator drug.86However, the length of an
extension is limited in several ways: 1) the patent may not be extended for more than ﬁve years, 2) the term
allowed by the extension plus the remaining unexpired term on the patent may not exceed fourteen years,
3) the period covering activities prior to the issuance of the patent may not be counted, and 4) time during
79See Klenﬁeld, supra note 51, at 254.
80See 35 U.S.C. §156(a) (2001).
81See id.
82See id.
83See id.
84See id.
85See id. §156(d)(1).
86See id. §156(c),(g).
20which the applicant failed to exercise due diligence cannot be counted.87As an additional limitation, only
one patent for each innovator drug is eligible for an extension under the Hatch-Waxman Act.88 The other
major provision in the Hatch-Waxman Act relating to patents deals with deﬁning activities constituting
an act of patent infringement. Prior to 1984, any generic competitor attempting to enter the market had
to worry about claims of patent infringement under the holding of Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceu-
ticals. In Bolar, the court had held that the making, using, or selling of a patented invention was an act
of patent infringement even if the only purpose of such activity was to obtain regulatory approval.89This
holding meant, in essence, that generic competitors could not do anything towards obtaining FDA approval
until a patent on an innovator drug expired. Thus, innovator drug companies had a de facto extension on
their patents. The Hatch-Waxman Act changed this by declaring that making, using, or selling a patented
invention solely for uses reasonably related to developing and submitting an ANDA to the FDA was not an
act of infringement.90Thus, generics could make preparations to enter the market before the expiration of
the innovator’s patent. This provision reﬂected Congress’s view that the preparation of an ANDA has no ad-
verse economic impact on the patent holder’s rights.91In addition, allowing ANDA preparation to commence
before the pioneer’s patent expires beneﬁts competition by preventing the patent holder’s exclusivity from
extending beyond the expiration of patent rights. Thus, Congress hoped to strike an equilibrium between
innovation and competition by balancing patent extensions with a provision that basically enabled generic
drug companies to enter the market the day after the innovator’s patent expired.
Despite overturning Bolar, the Hatch-Waxman Act did place one limit on the type of activities during the
87See id.
88See id. §156(c)(4).
89See Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
90See 35 U.S.C. §271(e) (2001).
91See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), supra note 48, at 46.
21application process that would not constitute patent infringement. Under the statute, it is still an act of
infringement to submit an ANDA for a drug under patent if the purpose of submitting the ANDA is to get
approval of the ANDA with an eﬀective date prior to the expiration of the patent.92This type of “constructive
infringement” enables pioneer drug companies to bring patent infringement cases against those companies
that ﬁle Paragraph IV certiﬁcations under the ANDA provisions. Ultimately, this provision serves as a
balance to the 180-day exclusivity rule in the ANDA provisions - those generics who make Paragraph IV
challenges are rewarded with the 180-day exclusivity period but pioneer drug companies still have the oppor-
tunity to defend their patent in court. Once again, policymakers provided generics an incentive to compete,
but carefully tried not to destroy pioneers’ incentive to innovate in the process.
C.
The Hatch-Waxman Balancing Act
Congress intended the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act to strike a delicate balance between the needs
of generic drug companies, the needs of innovator drug companies, and the overall needs of society. Congress
included the ANDA provisions as a source of potential positive economic welfare gains to generic drug
companies and to society as a whole. However, Congress recognized that these provisions might impose
costs on innovator drug companies and ultimately on society. Thus, Congress also included the patent term
extension provisions in order to try to alleviate these costs.
92See id.
22The ﬁrst potential source of economic gain came from the abbreviated approval requirements for generic
drugs. By allowing generic manufacturers to rely on the safety and eﬃcacy tests of the innovator drug,
the Act eliminated duplicative testing which had no valid scientiﬁc purpose.93The expectation was that the
Act would reduce the cost of the approval process to generic drug manufacturers who would ultimately
pass those savings on to consumers. The second potential source of economic gain came from the increased
incentives for generic entry into the market. The existence of more generic competition was expected to
lower prices for consumers and eliminate some of the deadweight loss to society that is typically associated
with monopolies. The hope was that the statute would lead to beneﬁcial transfers of wealth from producers
to consumers.94 Despite these potential economic gains, there was also the potential for economic loss. The
existence of more vigorous competition in the pharmaceutical industry due to a larger generic market could
potentially harm pioneer drug companies by lowering their market share or by forcing them to lower their
prices.95As a result, pioneer drug companies would see a decrease in the expected returns on their research
and development and would therefore have less incentive to pursue new innovations.96Given the harm that
could result to consumers from decreased innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, the drafters of the
Hatch-Waxman Act felt the need to balance the ANDA provisions that encouraged generic competition with
provisions that would encourage pioneer innovation. The plan was for patent extension term provisions to
maintain pioneer drug company proﬁts enough to insure that the research and development of innovator
drug companies would not suﬀer any major adverse eﬀects.97Ultimately, the policymakers hoped that this
would result in consumers having greater access to drugs that were both inexpensive and revolutionary.
93See Grabowski, supra note 61, at 196.
94See id.
95See id.
96See id.
97See id at 198.
23D.
Antitrust Law and Intellectual Property Law Within the Context of the Hatch-
Waxman Act
Despite the fact that the Hatch-Waxman Act tries to embrace the policies underlying both the intellectual
property laws and the antitrust laws, the two sets of laws still come into conﬂict under the statute’s regula-
tory regime. This is particularly true in the context of patent litigation that arises under the Hatch-Waxman
Act. First, since ﬁnal FDA approval of a generic drug is delayed for up to thirty months if there is ongoing
patent litigation, some innovator drug companies ﬁle frivolous patent infringement cases against potential
generic entrants as a means of extending their market exclusivity. With these types of frivolous lawsuits,
the policies underlying the intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws come into direct conﬂict with
neither policy ultimately being furthered.98This is because the automatic thirty-month stay that is intended
to counter any negative impacts on innovation winds up preventing a potential competitor from entering the
market.
An even larger anticompetitive problem arises if the litigating parties do not pursue these patent infringe-
ment cases to their conclusion in the court system, but rather choose to settle their cases out of court.
Although settlements often beneﬁt both the private parties involved in a litigation and society as a whole,
they can also raise signiﬁcant antitrust concerns by eliminating or reducing competition.99The reduction in
competition caused by these settlements may destroy some of the incentives that drug companies have for
developing new, innovative products.100Thus, patent settlements may destroy the delicate balance between
98See, e.g., Hangards v. Ethicon, 601 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that “[p]atentees must be permitted to test the
validity of their patents in court through actions against alleged infringers...On the other hand, infringement actions initiated
and conducted in bad faith contribute nothing to the furtherance of the policies of either the patent law or the antitrust law.”).
99See discussion infra Part IV.
100See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
24innovation and competition that the drafters of the Hatch-Waxman Act hoped to create. The question for
policymakers, then, becomes how to restore that equilibrium between encouraging innovation and fostering
competition.
IV.
Patent Settlements and the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Restoration Act of 1984
A.
General Overview of the Beneﬁts and Costs of Settlements
Traditionally, the legal system has encouraged the settlement of ongoing litigation because of the beneﬁts
that incur to parties involved in litigation as well as the beneﬁts that incur to society as a whole.101For
parties involved in litigation, settlements are beneﬁcial in that they allow the parties to avoid many of the
transaction costs associated with litigating a case to its full conclusion.102 Settlements are also beneﬁcial to
parties involved in litigation because they reduce risks and uncertainty.103 Society beneﬁts from settlements
because they decrease court costs and reduce congestion within the judicial system.104Both the parties
101See, e.g., McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 215 (1994) (noting that “public policy wisely encourages settle-
ment...”).
102Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, May 1, 2001, available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/wp/501.pdf.
103See id.
104See id.
25involved in litigation and society beneﬁt from quick resolution of the issues.105 The legal system’s preference
for settlement is no diﬀerent in the patent litigation context.106In addition to saving time and money and to
reducing risk, patent settlements may provide added beneﬁts if they clarify intellectual property rights and
foster competition. Such beneﬁts arise if a settlement allows the potential new entrant to bring their product
to market sooner than expected or to bring it to market at all.107 Settlements of a patent infringement case
may also provide pro-competitive beneﬁts if the terms of the agreement are such that the ﬁrms combine
their intellectual property to introduce a new product that would not otherwise exist.108 Finally, patent
settlements, depending on their terms, may enable the settling parties to compete more eﬀectively with other
ﬁrms in the market.
Despite the preferential status given to settlements within the legal system, settlements are not always
without their costs. All settlements, whether related to the resolution of patent disputes or not, may
potentially harm society if they prevent resolution of a legal issue that may be applicable beyond just the
case at hand.109The costs of patent settlements, in particular, can be quite high. This is because in addition
to the private interests involved, there is also a public interest in limiting the grant of patent monopolies to
“novel and useful inventions.”110Within the patent arena, settlement without resolution of the legal issue can
be quite problematic since patent infringement suits often acts as a check on the patent process by revealing
105See id.
106See, e.g., ARCO Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976) (noting that “[p]ublic policy strongly
favors settlement of disputes without litigation. Settlement is of particular value in patent litigation, the nature of which is
inordinately complex and time-consuming.”).
107See Thomas B. Leary, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Issues in Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent
Disputes, Remarks at the Sixth Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum, Northwestern University School of Law (Nov. 3, 2000),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/learypharma.htm.
108See Balto, supra note 5, at 328.
109See Shapiro, supra note 102.
110See Harry M. Reasoner and Scott J. Atlas, Innovative Relief and Class Action Issues in Government and Private Actions:
The Settlement of Litigation as a Ground for Antitrust Liability, 50 Antitrust L.J. 115, 115 (1981).
26information that would have kept the Patent and Trademark Oﬃce from issuing a patent had the information
been disclosed.111Thus, settlements may impose costs on society by allowing inventions that are not worthy of
patent protection to maintain their government-sanctioned monopoly.112 Patent settlements may also impose
costs on society if they foster collusion and restrict competition among parties.113There are numerous ways
in which a patent settlement can be structured so as to reduce competition between the parties. For example,
a patent holder may eliminate a potential competitor by using a settlement as an opportunity to purchase
the ﬁrm challenging its patent.114A patent holder might also be able to eliminate a potential competitor by
negotiating a settlement in which the patent challenger is paid in exchange for an agreement not to enter the
market.115Even if a settlement does not entirely eliminate a potential competitor, competition can still be
harmed if the two parties enter an agreement whereby they split up the market in some manner such that
they both participate in the market but do not directly compete.116Finally, a challenger might agree to pay
royalties to the patent holder in conjunction with a future ﬁxed payment from the patent holder.117
111See Areeda, supra note 13, at 444.
112See id.
113See id.
114See id. In such cases, the patent holder would likely induce the sale by setting the purchase price so as to split the gains
from decreased competition between the patent holder and the challenger.
115See id.
116See id.
117See id.
27B.
Patent Settlements Within the Context of the Pharmaceutical Industry
In the pharmaceutical industry, the anticompetitive problems that arise out of patent settlements are played
oﬀ against the special regulatory framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Patent settlements in the pharma-
ceutical context can be used as a pretext for paying oﬀ generic manufacturers in order to delay or prevent
their entry into the market.118 The entry of a generic product into the market will cause the proﬁts of an
innovator drug to decrease dramatically.119Because this drop in the innovator drug company’s monopoly
proﬁts will be much larger than the anticipated proﬁts of the generic manufacturer in a competitive mar-
ket, there are incentives for the innovator and the generic to cooperate.120If the generic manufacturer is
unsure about its chances of winning the case, it has an incentive to settle and delay entry into the market
until the case is concluded since potential damages for infringement, measured in terms of the innovator’s
lost monopoly proﬁts, would greatly exceed the proﬁts that the entrant would make in a competitive mar-
ket.121The innovator has an incentive to settle, even if it is conﬁdent that it can win, because the generic
manufacturer most likely would not be able to pay damages if it lost the suit, meaning that the innovator
would not be able to recover lost proﬁts.122If the innovator is not conﬁdent about its chances, it has even
more incentive to settle in order to maintain its monopoly over the market and it is likely to be willing to
118See Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too
Far?, 41 IDEA: J.L. & Tech. 227 (2001).
119See Leary, supra note 107.
120See id.
121See id.
122See id.
28share part of its monopoly rents in order to do so.123 In these circumstances, the generic manufacturer still
has incentive to settle assuming that the innovator pays the generic as much, if not more, money than the
generic would receive by entering the competitive market.124 Delayed entry of the generic drug that is the
subject of the suit is not the only potential problem with these settlements. These settlements also raise
problems because they sometimes involve restrictions on non-infringing drugs in addition to restrictions on
the drug at issue in the case.125In the Hatch-Waxman context, patent litigation settlements may prove even
more problematic because they usually aﬀect not only the involved parties but also non-party manufacturers.
Since the Hatch-Waxman Act does not allow any other generic to enter the market until the ﬁrst generic
has been on the market for 180 days, innovator drug companies can use settlements to prolong their market
exclusivity.126 There are several ways in which an innovator drug company can use a settlement to prolong
its market exclusivity. First, the innovator and the generic can enter into a settlement that results in a
judgment in favor of the validity of the patent.127The eﬀect of this is to prevent the generic from obtaining
FDA approval and thus from marketing its version of the drug until the patent runs out, meaning that the
180-day exclusivity period does not begin until the patent expires.128Second, if the innovator is not likely
to prevail in court, the generic might agree to stay out of the market for money or lucrative licenses on
other products.129Third, even if the innovator is in a strong position, the two parties might enter into a
123See Sheila F. Anthony, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, Riddles and Lessons from the Prescription Drug
Wars: Antitrust Implications of Certain Types of Agreements Involving Intellectual Property, Presented Before the
Attendees of the ABA “Antitrust and Intellectual Property: The Crossroads” Program (June 1, 2000), available at
http://www/ftc/gov/speeches/Anthony/sﬁp000601.htm.
124See id.
125See Glasgow, supra note 118.
126See Balto, supra note 5, at 331.
127See id.
128See id.
129See id.
29partial settlement that provides the generic with incentives not to enter the market until after the patent
expires (for example, payments or lucrative licenses for other products).130Finally, the settlement might
contain provisions that prevent waivers of the 180-day exclusivity period.131Thus, patent settlements in the
pharmaceutical industry pose numerous anticompetitive problems for the antitrust authorities.
C.
Patent Litigation Settlements and The Antitrust Laws
The legal precedents with regard to antitrust challenges to patent settlement cases indicate that patent
settlements are not per se illegal, but rather require a fact-speciﬁc inquiry. In a leading United States
Supreme Court case on settlements, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, the Court held that “where there
are legitimately conﬂicting [patent] claims or threatened interferences, a settlement by agreement, rather than
by litigation, is not precluded by the [Sherman] Act.”132However, thirty years later, in United States v. Singer
Manufacturing Co., the United States Supreme Court, speciﬁcally addressing patent settlements, rejected
the District Court’s conclusion that the purpose of the agreement between the two parties involved in the case
had been primarily the settlement a dispute.133Instead, the Court concluded that the settlement agreement
between the parties had been part of a scheme to restrain trade and exclude foreign competition.134In
130See id.
131See id.
132Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931).
133See U.S. v. Singer Mfg Co., 374 U.S. 174, 192 (1963).
134See id. at 194-95.
30reaching this conclusion, the Court made clear that it is “not the mere act of settlement but the intent
of the parties in entering into that settlement and their action pursuant thereto that, in law, constitute
[an antitrust] violation.”135In a concurring opinion, Justice Byron White noted that “the settlement of an
interference in which the only interests at stake are those of the adversaries...may well be consistent with
the general policy favoring settlement of litgation.”136However, he went on to note that:
[T]he present case involves a less innocuous setting...[in] which the parties have subordi-
nated to their private ends—the public interest in granting patent monopolies only when
the progress of the useful arts and of science will be furthered because as consideration for
its grant the public is given a novel and useful invention.137
Thus, despite the fact that patent settlements are not per se illegal, it seems that absent any pro-competitive
justiﬁcations, patent settlements that negatively aﬀect competition are likely to be illegal. When adding con-
siderations of the costs and beneﬁts of patent settlements to the delicate balancing act between intellectual
property rights and antitrust, the antitrust authorities are presented with a complex framework of conﬂicting
objectives. All of these objectives must be considered when analyzing patent infringement settlements in the
Hatch-Waxman context and when looking for ways to solve the problems that they create.
V.
Speciﬁc Patent Settlement Cases in the Pharmaceutical Industry
135Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir. 1976) (discussing Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 283
U.S. 163 (1931)).
136Singer Mfg,, 374 U.S. at 199.
31Three cases ﬁled by the Federal Trade Commission against brand name drug manufacturers and generic drug
manufacturers provide examples of the types of anticompetitive concerns that arise in the context of patent
settlements in the pharmaceutical industry. The ﬁrst of these cases involved a settlement between Abbott
Laboratories (“Abbott”) and Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Geneva”) related to the marketing of a generic
version of the drug Hytrin. The second case involved a settlement between Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.
(“Hoechst MRI”) and Andrx Corporation (“Andrx”) over the marketing of a generic version of the drug
Cardizem CD. The ﬁnal case involved a settlement between Schering-Plough Corporation (“Schering”) and
Upsher-Smith Laboratories (“Upsher”) as well as a settlement between Schering-Plough Corporation and
American Home Products Corporation (“AHP”), both of which related to generic versions of K-Dur 20.
A.
Abbot Laboratories and Geneva Pharmaceuticals
Abbott Laboratories began marketing the tablet form of Hytrin, the pioneer drug in the United States
containing terazosin hydrochloride (“terozosin HCL”), in 1987.138Hytrin has been one of Abbott’s most
important products because of its proﬁtability. In 1998 alone, Abbott’s sales of Hytrin in the United States
were $542 million.139During the ﬁrst six months of 1999, Abbott reported $292 million in United States sales
of Hytrin, twenty percent of the net sales of Abbott’s United States pharmaceutical products division.140
138See Complaint ¶ 10, 11, 14, In the Matter of Abbott Labs. And Geneva Pharm., (May 22, 2000) (FTC Dkt. No. C-3945,),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/abbottgenevacomp.htm. Terazosin hydrochloride is a compound used to treat
benign prostatic hyperplasia and hypertension. Abbott introduced a capsule form of Hytrin in 1995. See id.
139See id.
140See id.
32Geneva was the ﬁrst manufacturer to ﬁle an ANDA under the Hatch-Waxman Act for a generic version
of terazosin HCL.141It ﬁled an ANDA for a tablet version in January 1993 and for a capsule version in
December 1995.142Shortly thereafter, in early 1996, Abbott notiﬁed the FDA of a new patent that it had
obtained related to Hytrin, prompting the FDA to list the new patent in the FDA Orange Book. 143Then, in
April 1996, Geneva ﬁled a Paragraph IV certiﬁcation with the FDA under the ANDA provisions of the Hatch
Waxman-Act.144In its certiﬁcation, Geneva claimed that neither its tablet version nor its capsule version
infringed on any of Abbott’s Hytrin patents, including the newly listed patent.145Keeping with the provisions
of the Hatch-Waxman Act, Geneva then notiﬁed Abbott of the Paragraph IV certiﬁcation.146In response
to Geneva’s Paragraph IV certiﬁcation, Abbott ﬁled a patent infringement suit against Geneva related to
the tablet product in the Northern District of Illinois on June 4, 1996.147 This lawsuit triggered the Hatch-
Waxman Act thirty-month stay for the tablet version, meaning that Geneva could not bring its generic tablet
version to market until December 1998. 148Abbott failed, however, to ﬁle a claim related to the capsule
product within the forty-ﬁve day period mandated by the Hatch-Waxman Act.149Thus, FDA review of the
ANDA for the capsule version continued and on March 30, 1998, the FDA granted Geneva ﬁnal approval to
market generic terazosin HCL capsules.150Because Geneva was the ﬁrst manufacturer to submit Paragraph
141See id. ¶ 16.
142See id.
143See id. ¶17.
144See id.
145See id.
146See id.
147See id. ¶18.
148See id. ¶19.
149See id.
150See id. ¶22.
33IV certiﬁcation, it was entitled to the Hatch-Waxman Act’s 180-day exclusivity period for both its capsule
version and its tablet version.151 Upon receiving ﬁnal FDA approval on March 30, Geneva told Abbott that
it would begin marketing its generic version of terazosin HCL capsules unless paid by Abbott.152According
to estimates made by Abbott, entry of Geneva’s generic capsules on April 1, 1998 would have eliminated
over $185 million in Hytrin sales in a six-month period.153Wanting to keep generic versions of Hytrin oﬀ the
market until February 2000, and estimating that Geneva’s revenues for launching a generic would be one to
one-and-a-half million dollars, Abbott negotiated an agreement with Geneva whereby Abbott would pay a
premium over Geneva’s estimated revenues to prevent Geneva from entering the market.154More speciﬁcally,
under the April 1, 1998 agreement, Geneva would not enter the market with either a generic terazosin HCL
capsule or tablet product until the earlier of 1) the ﬁnal resolution of the tablet patent infringement case,
including review all the way up to the United States Supreme Court, or 2) entry of another generic terazosin
HCL product onto the market.155Geneva also would not transfer, assign, or relinquish its right to the 180-
day exclusivity period to another drug manufacturer.156In return, Abbott agreed to pay Geneva $4.5 million
a month in non-refundable payments until there was a district court judgment in the patent infringement
litigation.157If the district court determined that Geneva’s tablet product did not infringe on Abbott’s
patents, then Abbott would pay 4.5 million a month into an escrow fund until the ﬁnal resolution of the
litigation, with whomever ultimately prevailed in the litigation receiving the money from the escrow fund.158
151See id. ¶23.
152See id. ¶24.
153See id.
154See id. ¶24, 25.
155See id. ¶26
156See id.
157See id. ¶27.
158See id.
34On September 1, 1998, the district court granted Geneva’s motion for summary judgment, invalidating
Abbott’s patent under the on-sale provision of 35 U.S.C. §102(b).159The court was unaware of the agreement
between Abbott and Geneva,160however, Geneva kept to the agreement and did not enter into the market
with either its generic capsules or tablets.161The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
aﬃrmed the summary judgment on July 1, 1999.162By August 1999, the parties became aware that the
FTC was investigating their agreement and decided to cancel it.163On August 13, 1999, Geneva entered the
terazosin HCL market with its generic capsule product.164The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari
on January 10, 2000.165 In May 2000, the Federal Trade Commission brought an enforcement action against
Abbott and Geneva, alleging that the two drug manufacturers had engaged in conduct that violated Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §45.166Speciﬁcally, the FTC claimed: 1) that the agreement
between the parties was an unreasonable restraint of trade, 2) that the parties had acted with the speciﬁc
intent that Abbott monopolize the market and had engaged in acts to further the conspiracy to monopolize,
3) that Abbott had exercised its monopoly power in the relevant market, and 4) that the parties’ acts were
unfair methods of competition.167The FTC maintained that the eﬀect of these antitrust violations was to
deprive consumers of the beneﬁt of new competition from Geneva, thus forcing them to buy a more expensive
159See id. ¶31.
160See id. ¶28.
161See id. ¶32.
162See id. ¶33.
163See id.
164See id.
165See id.
166See id. ¶40.
167See id. ¶40-43.
35brand-name product.168Because the settlement also barred Geneva from relinquishing its 180-day exclusivity
period, the violations also had the eﬀect of preventing any other generic from entering the market despite
the fact that as of February 1999 at least one other generic terazosin HCL had satisﬁed the FDA’s approval
requirements.169 As a result of the investigation, Abbott and Geneva entered into a consent order with the
FTC. In general, the consent order barred restrictions on giving up the Hatch-Waxman 180-day exclusivity
period and on entering the market with a non-infringing product.170The consent order also required court
approval for any payments made to generics in exchange for an agreement to stay oﬀ the market when
such an agreement is made in the context of interim settlement of patent litigation.171In addition to seeking
court approval, the parties were also required to provide the FTC with notice of any payment so that the
Commission can present its views to the court.172The order also required Abbott and Geneva to give the
FTC written notice thirty days before entering into any other settlement in any other context.173Finally,
the consent order required Geneva to waive its right to the 180-day exclusivity period for its generic tablet
product.174 The consent order in the Abbott/Geneva case was the ﬁrst resolution of a challenge by antitrust
enforcers to a private settlement made in the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s provisions. This consent
order was issued the same day the FTC issued a complaint against two other pharmaceutical companies,
Hoechst Marion Russell, Inc. and Andrx Corporation, alleging similar antitrust violations. However, despite
168See id. ¶35.
169See id. ¶38.
170Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Sheila F. Anthony, Mozelle W. Thompson, Orson Swindle,
and Thomas B. Leary, Abbott Laboratories and Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Docket Nos. C-3945 and C-3946, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/abbottgenevastatement.htm.
171See id.
172See id.
173See id.
174See id.
36the similarities between the cases, the FTC did not advocate a per se rule against such settlements. Rather,
the Commission advocated a fact-speciﬁc inquiry into whether there were any pro-competitive justiﬁcations
for such an agreement.175The FTC put pharmaceutical companies on notice that such arrangements have the
potential to cause serious anticompetitive problems and would be closely scrutinized.176The FTC also put
companies on notice that in the future the Commission might consider pursuing the full range of remedies
available under the antitrust laws, including disgorgement of proﬁts.177
B.
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. and Andrx Corporation
The same day the FTC ﬁled the consent order in the Abbott/Geneva case, the Commission issued an admin-
istrative complaint against two other pharmaceutical companies, Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. and Andrx
Corporation, alleging concerns similar to those expressed in the Abbott/Geneva case. The case involving
Hoechst MRI and Andrx revolved around the market for once-a-day diltiazem, a type of calcium channel
blocker for which there is no acceptable substitute.178 Hoechst MRI was the manufacturer of the brand-name
drug Cardizem CD, a cardiovascular drug used to treat hypertension and angina.179According to the FTC,
Cardizem CD accounted for over seventy percent of the total sales of once-a-day diltiazem and thus gave
175See id. (emphasizing that “[the FTC] recognize[s] that there may be market settings in which similar but less restrictive
arrangements could be justiﬁed, and each case must be examined with respect to its particular facts.”)
176See id.
177See id.
178See Complaint ¶ 12, In the Matter of Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., Carderm Capital L.P., and Andrx Corp. (Mar. 16,
2000) (FTC Dkt No. 9293) [hereinafter Hoechst MRI Complaint], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/ hoechstandrx-
complaint.htm.
179See id. ¶1.
37Hoechst MRI monopoly power in the United States over the once-a-day diltiazem market.180Hoechst MRI
estimated that a generic version of Cardizem CD, sold at seventy percent of Cardizem CD’s price, would
capture around forty percent of Cardizem CD’s sales within a year.181 Andrx ﬁled the ﬁrst ANDA under
the Hatch-Waxman Act for a generic version of Cardizem CD in September 1995.182In December 1995, An-
drx notiﬁed Hoechst MRI of its Paragraph IV certiﬁcation and became entitled to the 180-day exclusivity
period under the Hatch-Waxman Act.183Hoechst MRI ﬁled a patent infringement suit against Andrx in the
Southern District of Florida on January 31, 1996.184Since this was within the forty-ﬁve day ﬁling period
prescribed by the Hatch-Waxman Act, the suit triggered a thirty-month stay on sales of Andrx’s generic
version until July 1998.185 In addition to Andrx, two other companies submitted ANDA’s for generic ver-
sions of Cardizem CD. Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. ﬁled an ANDA with the FDA in January 1997.186In
response, Hoechst MRI ﬁled a patent infringement case against Purepac in the Southern District of New
Jersey, triggering a thirty-month stay until July 1999.187Biovail Corporation International ﬁled the third
ANDA for generic once-a-day diltiazem on June 19, 1997. In August 1997, Hoechst MRI oﬀered to pay
Biovail money to complete the testing and FDA approval process for a new Probucol indication.188At the
time, Hoechst MRI held the NDA for Probucol but was neither marketing nor selling the drug.189Hoechst
180See id. ¶14.
181See id. ¶30.
182See id. ¶17.
183See id.
184See id. ¶18.
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187See id.
188See id. ¶21.
189See id.
38MRI’s oﬀer was contingent on an agreement by Biovail not to enter into the once-a-day diltiazem market
with a generic version of Carizem CD until July 1999.190Biovail rejected Hoechst MRI’s proposal, however,
Hoechst MRI still did not sue Biovail for patent infringement with regard to the ANDA for a generic version
of Cardizem CD.191 In late July of 1997, Hoechst MRI and Andrx began discussing a possible settlement to
their patent litigation.192Finally, on September 24, 1997, nine months before the 30-month stay was set to
expire, Hoechst MRI and Andrx entered into an agreement that did not settle the patent infringement suit
but did delay Andrx’s entry into the market.193Andrx agreed not to enter the market until the earliest of
1) entry of ﬁnal judgment in the patent infringement case, 2) Andrx obtaining a license from Hoechst MRI,
or 3) Hoechst MRI providing notice to Andrx of an intent to license a third party or to sell its own generic
version of Cardizem CD.194In addition, Andrx agreed not to sell any non-infringing bioequivalent or generic
version of Cardizem, and not to withdraw its ANDA or give up its 180-day exclusivity period until entry of
the ﬁnal judgment in the patent infringement case.195In return, Hoechst MRI agreed to begin paying Andrx
ten million dollars per quarter once Andrx obtained ﬁnal FDA approval of its ANDA.196Hoechst was to
continue to making such payments throughout the time period referred to above.197Were Hoechst MRI to
lose the patent litigation suit, the agreement also called for Hoechst MRI to pay Andrx an additional sixty
million dollars per year for that same time period.198The agreement also included a provision whereby Andrx
190See id.
191See id.
192See id. ¶ 22.
193See id. ¶ 23.
194See id.
195See id.
196See id. ¶24.
197See id.
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39had the option to license Cardizem CD beginning January 9, 2000 with the amount of royalties to be set
based on the ultimate outcome of the patent infringement case.199 On July 9, 1998 Andrx received ﬁnal FDA
approval for its ANDA, but upheld its agreement with Hoechst MRI and did not begin marketing its generic
version of Cardizem CD.200In return, Hoechst MRI began its quarterly payments to Andrx.201Subsequently,
Andrx ﬁled a supplemental ANDA for a modiﬁed version of its generic Cardizem CD with the FDA and gave
Hoechst MRI notice of Paragraph IV certiﬁcation for the supplemental ANDA.202In June of 1999, the FDA
approved Andrx’s supplemental ANDA, and Andrx and Hoechst MRI entered into a new agreement that did
away with the ﬁrst agreement.203This new agreement allowed Andrx to begin marketing its generic version
of Cardizem CD so Andrx entered the market with its generic version on June 23, 1999.204 On March 16,
2000, the FTC ﬁled a complaint against Hoechst MRI and Andrx alleging various violations of Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Although the agreement at issue had already been terminated, the
FTC proceeded with its case to prevent the recurrence of similar agreements.205 The FTC alleged that 1)
the agreement between Hoechst MRI and Andrx constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade, 2) Hoechst
MRI had attempted to monopolize the once-a-day diltiazem market through both its agreement with Andrx
and its attempt to reach a similar agreement with Biovail, 3) Hoechst MRI and Andrx had conspired to
monopolize the relevant market, and 4) the two companies had engaged in actions which constituted unfair
199See id. ¶25.
200See id. ¶27.
201See id.
202See id. ¶28.
203See id.
204See id.
205See Analysis to Aid Public Comment at 4, In the Matter of Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., Carderm Capital
L.P., and Andrx Corp. (Apr. 2, 2001) (FTC Dkt. No. 9293) [hereinafter Hoechst MRI Analysis], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/hoechstanalysis.pdf.
40methods of competition.206 In April 2001, the FTC announced a consent order with Hoechst MRI and An-
drx.207The FTC’s consent order barred agreements with restrictions on 1) giving up the 180-day exclusivity
period of Hatch-Waxman and 2) entering the market with a non-infringing product.208The consent order
also required court approval of interim settlements whereby generic manufacturers temporarily delay market
entry in return for payments from the brand name manufacturer, and required that notice of such agree-
ments be given to the FTC so that the Commission could make comments to the court.209Finally, the order
required Hoechst MRI and Andrx to give the FTC thirty days written notice before entering into similar
agreements in other situations.210As with the Abbott/Geneva case, the FTC did not advocate a per se rule
against patent settlements, but rather utilized a fact-speciﬁc approach that asked whether the arrangement
had any pro-competitive justiﬁcations which outweighed the anticompetitive eﬀects.
C.
Schering-Plough Corporation, Upsher-Smith Laboratories, and American Home
Products Corporation
The third FTC case involving patent settlements within the pharmaceutical industry diﬀers slightly from the
ﬁrst two in that it involves two separate agreements and three diﬀerent pharmaceutical companies. At issue
206See Hoechst MRI Complaint, supra note 178, at ¶¶ 36-39.
207See Hoechst MRI Analysis, supra note 205, at 5.
208See id.
209See id.
210See id.
41in the case involving Schering, Upsher, and AHP, was K-Dur 20, a prescription drug sold by Schering.211K-
Dur 20 is a twenty milliequivalent extended release potassium chloride supplement that is sold in both tablet
and capsule forms.212While potassium chloride itself is not patentable, Schering held a formulation patent
for K-Dur 20 related to the product’s controlled release properties.213Schering had approximately sixty-nine
percent of the sales in the potassium chloride supplement market and one hundred percent of the sales in
the twenty milliequivalent extended release potassium chloride tablet and capsule markets.214There were
no practical substitutes for potassium chloride supplements at that point, and while there were potassium
chloride products other than K-Dur 20, those products had not restricted Schering’s ability to price K-Dur
20.215At the time the FTC ﬁled suit, there was an NDA pending for a new powder form of potassium
chloride.216However, this new product had not yet been approved and probably would not have decreased
Schering’s market share anyway because of the advantages that tablet and capsules have over powders.217
On August 6, 1995 Upsher-Smith ﬁled an ANDA and Paragraph IV certiﬁcation with the FDA for Klor Con
M20.218The ANDA for Klor Con M20 was the ﬁrst ANDA for a generic version of K-Dur 20 to be ﬁled with
the FDA.219Schering estimated that in the ﬁrst year that K-Dur had generic competition, its sales would
211See Complaint ¶1, In the Matter of Schering-Plough Corp., Upsher-Smith Labs., and American Home Prods. Corp. (Mar.
30, 2001) (FTC Dkt. No. 9297), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/ scheringpart3cmp.pdf. K-Dur 20 is used to treat
patients with insuﬃcient levels of potassium. See id.
212See id. ¶22.
213See id. ¶33, 34.
214See id. ¶¶26, 27.
215See id. ¶¶23, 25.
216See id. ¶28.
217See id.
218See id. ¶38.
219See id.
42be reduced by over $30 million.220Therefore, Schering stood to see a substantial loss in proﬁts if a generic
version of K-Dur obtained FDA approval.
Upsher notiﬁed Schering of its Paragraph IV certiﬁcation on November 3, 1995.221In December 1995, Scher-
ing sued Upsher-Smith in the District of New Jersey, thus triggering the thirty-month stay on ﬁnal FDA
approval mandated by the Hatch-Waxman Act.222In the ﬁrst half of 1997, as the infringement case pro-
gressed, Upsher-Smith began to make preparations to introduce Klor Con M20 to the market upon expi-
ration of the thirty-month stay in May 1998.223However, on June 17, 1997, right before the infringement
case went to trial, Schering and Upsher-Smith agreed to settle the litigation.224In exchange for a promise by
Upsher-Smith not to enter the market with either Klor Con M20 or any other generic version of K-Dur 20,
regardless of whether that product infringed on Schering’s patents, Schering promised to pay Upsher-Smith
payments of sixty million dollars.225The settlement also included a provision whereby Schering received li-
censes to market ﬁve of Upsher-Smith’s products.226Four of these products Schering never actually sold on
the market.227At the time of the suit, Schering had no expectation of making additional sales of any of the
ﬁve products.228Finally, under the settlement, both parties agreed to dismiss the infringement case without
prejudice.229In November 1998, Upsher-the FDA gave Upsher-Smith ﬁnal approval to sell Klor Con M20,
220See id. ¶37.
221See id. ¶38.
222See id. ¶39.
223See id. ¶43.
224See id. ¶44.
225See id.
226See id.
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228See id. ¶44, 46.
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43however, Upsher-Smith upheld its end of the settlement and did not attempt to bring the generic to the
market.230 On December 12, 1995, ESI Lederle, Inc., a division of AHP [hereinafter collectively referred to
as “AHP”], ﬁled an ANDA with the FDA for a generic version of K-Dur 20 and notiﬁed Schering of the
Paragraph IV certiﬁcation.231Because AHP was the second ANDA ﬁler, it planned to market its generic only
after Upsher-Smith’s 180-day exclusivity period had ended.232Upon receiving notice of AHP’s ANDA and
Paragraph IV certiﬁcation, Schering ﬁled a patent infringement case against AHP in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania in February 1996.233By January 1998, Schering and AHP had reached an agreement in
principle to settle the infringement case.234On June 19, 1998, they formally executed the ﬁnal settlement
agreement.235Under the agreement, AHP agreed not to market more than one generic version of K-Dur
20 between January 2004 and September 2006, and not to participate in any bioequivalence studies until
September 2006.236In return, Schering promised to pay AHP ﬁve million dollars with another ten million
dollar payment to follow if AHP could prove that it would get FDA approval by June 30, 1999, and an
additional payment of ﬁfteen million dollars for licenses on two generics that AHP was developing.237The
FTC alleged that the ﬁfteen million dollars was not actually related to the value of the licensed products,
but rather represented the amount that AHP wanted in order to settle the case.238On May 11, 1999, AHP
received tentative approval from the FDA of its ANDA with ﬁnal approval withheld until the conclusion of
230See id. ¶49.
231See id. ¶51.
232See id. ¶52.
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44Upsher-Smith’s 180-day exclusivity period.239 On June 2, 1999, Andrx Corporation ﬁled a third ANDA for
a generic version of Schering’s K-Dur 20, but at the time of the FTC’s investigation, Schering had not sued
Andrx for patent infringement.240Like AHP, Andrx was unable to receive ﬁnal approval from the FDA to
market its generic until Upsher-Smith’s 180-day exclusivity period expired. The FTC did not take action
against Andrx in this case.
The FTC ﬁled a complaint against Schering, Upsher-Smith, and AHP on March 30, 2001. The complaint
alleged that the conduct of these three companies violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Speciﬁcally, the FTC claimed: 1) that Schering and Upsher-Smith’s agreement was an unreasonable restraint
on commerce and thus an unfair method of competition, 2) that Schering and AHP’s agreement was also an
unreasonable restraint on commerce and thus an unfair method of competition, 3) that Schering unlawfully
tried to preserve its monopoly power, and 4) that Schering, Upsher-Smith, and AHP had engaged in a
conspiracy to monopolize.241 The FTC’s claims against Schering and Upsher-Smith are still pending reso-
lution, however, the Commission has announced a proposed consent order with AHP.242The order prohibits
agreements in which the NDA holder gives the ANDA ﬁler something of value in exchange for a promise not
to enter the market for a certain period of time as well as agreements in which the ANDA ﬁler agrees not to
enter the market with a non-infringing generic product.243These terms apply to AHP regardless of whether
it is the ANDA ﬁler or the NDA holder.244The proposed order does distinguish between what AHP could
do as an ANDA ﬁrst ﬁler and what it could do as a subsequent ﬁler in that as a ﬁrst ﬁler it cannot receive
239See id. ¶60.
240See id. ¶61.
241See id. ¶68-71.
242See Agreement Containing Consent Order, In the Matter of Schering-Plough Corp., Upsher-Smith Labs., and American
Home Prods. Corp. (Feb. 9, 2002) (FTC Dkt. No. 9297).
243See Schering Analysis, supra note 4, at 3.
244See id.
45anything of value but as a subsequent ﬁler it can get a delayed license to market the ANDA product from
the NDA holder.245This distinction is made because as a subsequent ﬁler, AHP would not be able to block
entry by other potential competitors.246
D.
FTC Antitrust Concerns
Although there are often beneﬁts to be gained from the settlement of ongoing litigation,247the settlements in
each of these cases were challenged by the FTC because of the anticompetitive impact that each had on the
product market in question. On the most basic level, the settlements were problematic because they were
agreements between potential horizontal competitors that restricted competition by delaying the entry of a
new product.248The restraints on competition were particularly harmful in these settlements because of the
provisions whereby the generics agreed not to relinquish their 180-day exclusivity period. Such provisions
acted to prevent other potential competitors, even those not involved in the agreements, from being able to
enter the market.249Furthermore, the agreements prevented the potential entrant from marketing not only
the generic at issue in the infringement case, but also any other generic, regardless of whether it infringed
on the brand name drug involved.250Finally, the agreements contained payments that in eﬀect constituted
245See id.
246See id.
247See discussion supra Part IV.
248See Balto, supra note 5, at 334-35.
249See id.
250See id.
46the transfer of monopoly proﬁts from the patent holder to the alleged infringer in exchange for the ability
to maintain the monopoly.251 Although some might argue that the settlement agreements at issue were
really nothing more than stipulated preliminary injunctions, Former FTC Commissioner Sheila Anthony has
pointed out several reasons why the FTC rejected this view. In the ﬁrst place, a preliminary injunction usually
lasts only through the conclusion of the trial court level.252However, the agreements the FTC challenged
were to be eﬀective though the entire appeals process all the way up to the Supreme Court level. Secondly,
many of the agreements the FTC challenged involved non-refundable payments. A preliminary injunction,
on the other hand, usually only requires the moving party to post a bind to cover damages to the enjoined
party should that party win.253Thirdly, a preliminary injunction in a patent infringement case would only
be applicable to the potentially infringing product whereas many of the settlements at issue contained
restrictions on non-infringing products as well.254In addition, the settlements prevented the generic drug
company from relinquishing its 180-day exclusivity period or from transferring it to another party.255Finally,
these agreements were not subject to the same type of judicial review to which preliminary injunctions are
subject.256Whereas judges considering a preliminary injunction weigh the public interest and the likelihood
of success on the merits, no such balancing occurs with these private settlements.257
251See id.
252See Anthony, supra note 123. Although Commissioner Anthony was speciﬁcally referring to the case involving Abbott and
Geneva, the rationale is equally applicable to other patent settlement cases with similar terms.
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47VI.
Possible Solutions
As these recent FTC cases demonstrate, the regulatory structure of the Hatch-Waxman has loopholes that
enable innovator drug companies in the pharmaceutical industry to exploit the Act’s patent provisions to
the possible detriment of consumers. As one of the authors of the act has noted, “The law has been turned
on its head. We were trying to encourage more generics and through diﬀerent business arrangements, the
reverse has happened.”258In light of the costs that patent settlements exploiting these loopholes may impose
on consumers, policymakers increasingly have called for changes to or the total repeal of the Hatch-Waxman
Act. However, any attempt to change or repeal the Act must take into consideration the impact that the
Act has had on the pharmaceutical market as a whole instead of just looking at the eﬀects that patent
settlements have had on the market for particular drugs.
258Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Jeﬀ Gerth, Drug Makers’ Deals Swallow Competition, N.Y. Times, July 23, 2000.
48A.
The Impact of the Hatch-Waxman Act on the Pharmaceutical Industry
1.
The Impact of the Hatch-Waxman Act on Competition
Since the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the United States has seen an increasingly competitive generic
market. In 1983 among the top two hundred pharmaceutical companies, thirty-four of the ﬁfty-two drugs
produced by these companies that had expired patents (approximately sixty-ﬁve percent) had no generic
competitors.259However, when the Congressional Budget Oﬃce conducted a survey on the eﬀects of the
Hatch-Waxman Act in 1998, the number of generic drugs available to consumers had increased such that
generics were available for almost all of the top selling drugs with expired patents.260In 1984, only nineteen
percent of the prescription drugs sold in the United States (measured in “total countable units” such as
tablets or capsules) were generic drugs.261By 1996, forty-three percent of all prescription drug units sold in
the United States were generic drugs.262Thus, the period since 1984 has seen growth in the generic market
both in terms of an increase in the number of generic drugs available to consumers and in terms of the
percentage of prescriptions ﬁlled with generic drugs.
The result of increased competition from the generic market has been a decrease in the costs to consumers.
259See Grabowski, supra note 61, at 195-96.
260See CBO Study, supra note 1.
261See id. Countable units do not include injectable drugs and liquid forms of drugs, therefore, this percentage does not
represent a perfect measure of generic market share. See id.
262See id. The CBO Study attributes some of this growth in the generic market to the passage of state drug-substitution laws
which allow pharmacists to substitute a generic drug for a brand name drug regardless of what the prescription says and to the
promotion of generic substitution by certain government health programs like Medicaid and by many private health insurance
plans. However, the CBO considers the Hatch-Waxman Act to be a major contributor to the increase in the generic market.
See id.
49In a look at twenty-one diﬀerent brand-name prescription drugs, the Congressional Budget Oﬃce found that
the brand-name drugs on average lost forty-four percent of their market to generic drugs within the ﬁrst full
calendar year after patent expiration.263While this loss of market share generally does not cause brand name
drugs to lower their prices,264generics decrease the costs to consumers by oﬀering lower priced alternatives
to the brand-name drugs.
Generics also decrease costs to consumers by competing among themselves. In general, the ﬁrst generic
drug manufacturer to enter a market usually charges only about seventy to eighty percent of what an inno-
vator drug manufacturer charges for its product.265 When there are between one and ten ﬁrms marketing
generic versions of the brand-name drug, the generic retail price of a drug averages around sixty percent
of the price of the comparable brand-name drug.266If more than ten manufacturers enter the market, the
average generic prescription price falls even further to less than ﬁfty percent of the brand-name price.267
The cost savings that have resulted from the ability to use generics as a substitute for brand-name products
and from the competition between generics have been substantial to consumers. The Congressional Budget
Oﬃce estimates that in 1994 alone, consumers saved between eight and ten billion dollars by purchasing
generic drugs instead of the more expensive pioneer versions. In 1994, the average price of a prescription
for a brand-name drug was thirty-seven dollars.268By including prescriptions ﬁlled with a generic drug in
263See id.
264See id.
265See Molly Boast, Director, Bureau of Competition, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implications of
Patent Settlements (May 24, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/05/pharmstmy.htm.
266See CBO Study, supra note 1.
267See id.
268See id.
50that ﬁgure, the average price is only twenty-six dollars.269This means that generic substitution has lowered
the average cost of prescriptions by eleven dollars. Thus, the conclusion is that the Hatch-Waxman Act has
indeed achieved its goals of aiding the generic market and as a result, of obtaining lower prices for consumers.
2.
The Impact of the Hatch-Waxman Act on Incentives to Innovate
Despite increasing the amount of competition within the pharmaceutical industry, the Hatch-Waxman Act
does not seem to have signiﬁcantly decreased the incentives for innovation. According to the Congressional
Budget Oﬃce’s study, the FDA approved 101 drugs containing new chemical compounds between 1992 and
1995. For the ﬁfty-one of those drugs that received a patent extension,270the average extension lasted 2.9
years.271As a result, the average length of time between market entry and patent expiration for an innovator
drug has increased from nine years in 1984 to eleven to twelve years today.272At the same time that patent
life has increased by almost three years, the average time between patent expiration and generic entry has
gone from three years to almost immediate entry.273Since these three-year periods almost exactly oﬀset each
other, the Hatch-Waxman Act has not really changed the average point in a drug’s life at which generic
269See id.
270Of the 101 drugs examined by the CBO, ﬁfty-one received Hatch-Waxman extensions, twelve still had applications pending
for an extension, nineteen had no patent to extend, ﬁfteen already had fourteen years of patent life left and thus could not
receive further extension, and four did not apply for an extension. See id.
271See id. This ﬁgure includes those drugs subject to the two-year transitional cap for drugs undergoing clinical testing when
the Hatch-Waxman passed. Excluding those drugs, the average extension lasted 3.0 years. See id.
272See id.
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51entry occurs. 274 Even though the Hatch-Waxman Act has not had a substantial eﬀect on the point at which
generic entry occurs, as noted in the previous section, the Act did change the likelihood that generics would
become available as well as the average market share captured by generics. According to the Congressional
Budget Oﬃce’s study, this increased market share has reduced the present discounted value of returns for an
innovator drug by an average of about twenty-seven million dollars.275This represents a decline in expected
returns of about twelve percent.276However, based on the ﬁgures on the costs of bringing a drug to market
that the Congressional Budget Oﬃce used,277the level of returns from innovator drugs are still able to fully
cover the capitalized costs of research and development.278 Since the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act,
both the amount received from the sale of prescription drugs and the amount spent on research and devel-
opment has grown. Between 1985 and 1995, the sales from prescription drugs increased from $21.6 billion to
$60.7 billion, representing an increase from 5.7% to 6.9% of total health care expenditures.279In fact, the sale
of prescription drugs grew faster than the total health care spending during that period.280During the same
period, spending on research and development increased from 15.1% to 19.4% of brand-name sales.281Thus
despite the pressures from a growing generic market and the decreased returns from innovation, the rise in
spending on research and development indicates that the Hatch-Waxman Act has not destroyed the incentive
for investing in innovation.
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275See id.
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277At the time of the CBO study, manufacturers of innovator drugs were estimated to invest $200 million on average to bring
a new drug to market. For drugs introduced in the early 1980’s, earned returns exceeded the capitalized costs of development
by twenty-two to thirty-six million dollars. See id.
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52B.
Possible Solutions to the Problems Created by Patent Settlements in the Phar-
maceutical Industry
Because the Hatch-Waxman Act has enabled the generic market to grow signiﬁcantly without destroying the
incentives for innovation in the process, total repeal of the Hatch-Waxman Act in order to avoid some of the
anticompetitive issues that arise in the context of patent settlements seems quite extreme. Instead, policy
makers should look for ways to revise the Hatch-Waxman Act so as to preserve the beneﬁcial aspects of the
statute. There are two diﬀerent types of approaches that could be used – amending the Hatch-Waxman Act
so as to eliminate some of the loopholes or creating stricter regulations to govern pharmaceutical companies
that wish to settle patent disputes.
1.
Amending the Hatch-Waxman Act
a)
Adding a Triggering Period to the 180-day Exclusivity Rule
One way to avoid many of the anticompetitive eﬀects of patent settlements would be to alter the 180-day
exclusivity period. The FDA has already made such a proposal in part to address the issues that arise
53because of settlement and licensing agreements between innovator and generic drug manufacturers.282Under
the FDA’s proposed rule, the FDA would place a time limit on how long the ANDA ﬁrst ﬁler has to trigger its
right to receive the 180-day marketing exclusivity period.283The triggering period would involve a “use it or
lose it” provision in which a ﬁrst ﬁler would have 180 days to start the 180-day marketing period or else the
ﬁrst ﬁler loses the right to the 180 days of marketing exclusivity.284 The triggering period would begin once
a second generic drug company with a Paragraph IV certiﬁcation receives tentative FDA approval and would
require the ﬁrst ﬁler to either obtain a favorable ﬁnal court decision or to begin commercial marketing of its
generic.285However, there are three instances in which the triggering period would not begin to run on the
date of the second ﬁler’s tentative approval. If the ﬁrst ﬁler was involved in an ongoing patent infringement
litigation regarding the Paragraph IV certiﬁcation, the triggering period would not begin until the end of
the thirty day stay.286Second, if a court has issued a preliminary injunction preventing the ﬁrst ﬁler from
commercially marketing the drug, then the triggering period does not commence until the preliminary in-
junction ends.287Finally, the triggering period will not begin until the expiration of the statutorily described
exclusivity period for the listed drug.288 The implementation of a triggering period would help close up
some of the loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman Act because it would reduce the ability of patent settlements to
delay generic entry into the market.289First, a triggering period would insure that competition commences
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54soon after a pioneer’s patent expires if there is a generic company that has received FDA approval for its
ANDA. Either the ﬁrst ﬁler will get to market quickly and provide competition for the pioneer drug, or else
another generic will be able to enter the market to compete with the pioneer drug. Second, by placing the
triggering event in the hands of another party, the innovator drug company and the generic drug company
no longer have the ability to use an agreement to control entry into the market. Thus, the triggering period
would have an overall positive eﬀect on competition.
b)
Eliminating the 180-day Exclusivity Rule
An alternative to adding a triggering period to the 180-day exclusivity rule would be to eliminate the rule
entirely. The 180-day exclusivity period was included to reward those ﬁrst ﬁlers to challenge pioneer drug
companies patents. However, at the time this provision was included in the Hatch-Waxman Act, the drafters
“foolishly believed that patent challenges would only arise in cases where the validity of a basic patent was
at issue, that there was no realistic possibility that such cases could be settled, and that litigation would
be expensive.”290 Instead, experience has shown that the “potential proﬁt from a successful challenge far
exceeds the cost of litigation and risk can and has been minimized by careful selection of meritorious cases as
well as the real possibility of settlement.”291Arguably then, the 180-day exclusivity period is no longer even
necessary in order to stimulate the generic market. By eliminating the period entirely, multiple generics could
enter the market at one time, thus leading to more vigorous competition and lower prices for consumers.
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55c)
Eliminating the Thirty Month Injunction
Another possible way to end some of the abuses that occur in patent settlements would be to eliminate the
thirty-month automatic injunction that takes eﬀect when a pioneer drug company ﬁles a patent infringement
suit against a generic drug company which has provided Paragraph IV certiﬁcation. In fact, this suggestion
has been included in the Greater Access to Aﬀordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2001, a proposed amendment
to the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act that was introduced in both the House of Representatives and
the Senate in May 2001.292Eliminating the automatic injunction would be beneﬁcial to competition in several
ways. First, eliminating the thirty-month automatic injunction would allow frivolous or invalid patents to be
challenged more quickly.293Second, elimination of the thirty-month automatic injunction would take away the
incentive for pioneer drug companies to delay competition from generics by ﬁling patent infringement cases
that do not have any merit. Those pioneer drug companies that do have a meritorious claim would not be
harmed because they could still go to court and obtain a preliminary injunction against the generic company.
Third, because a pioneer drug company would have to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits in order to a preliminary injunction,294there would be reduced incentive for the pioneer to settle. A
pioneer drug company whose patent claims have been deemed strong enough by a court to merit a preliminary
injunction would have much less reason to share its proﬁts with a generic and the generic would have much
less bargaining power to induce the pioneer into a settlement. Finally, if a court does not grant a pioneer
a preliminary injunction there would be less of an incentive for a generic to enter into a settlement since it
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56could go to market immediately upon receiving FDA approval. Regardless, “the absence of an automatic
thirty-month injunction will serve to compel the parties to expedite the litigation process as a matter of
mutual self-interest in getting an early deﬁnitive court ruling on the merits.”295
2.
Stricter Regulation of Patent Litigation
a)
Require Parties to File Patent Settlements with the Government
In addition to amending provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act, another potential avenue for policymakers
to explore is stricter regulation of patent litigation. One proposal oﬀered by then Acting Assistant Attor-
ney General Joel Klein was to expand the Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger Notiﬁcation Act296to require that
patent settlements be ﬁled with the antitrust authorities.297The Patent Code currently requires parties to
ﬁle patent interference settlements with the Patent and Trademark Oﬃce and allows the Antitrust Division
to obtain these ﬁlings for review.298However, it is questionable whether this provision could ever actually be
eﬀective in dealing with anticompetitive issues because the Third Circuit has held that the statute does not
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57provide the Antitrust Division with standing to enforce it.299Enacting a separate requirement that parties
ﬁle settlements with the antitrust authorities would allow the antitrust authorities to “assess what is at
stake for competition in the matter while it is pending, putting [antitrust authorities] in a position to decide
quickly and...conﬁdently when confronted with a settlement.” 300The beneﬁt to Klein’s proposal is that
the antitrust authorities could either try to block an anticompetitive settlement on public interest grounds
or take over the defendant’s role and continue forward with the litigation.301However, critics of the proposal
have questioned where the antitrust authorities would get the resources to do these reviews and to what
extent antitrust authorities are equipped to determine the validity of patents.302 An alternative to Joel
Klein’s proposal, one which was suggest by the FTC in a “Comment” with the FDA, was that the FDA
require innovator and generic drug companies to ﬁle patent litigation settlements with the FDA.303The FDA
would then make these settlements accessible to the FTC.304The proposal is similar to Joel Klein’s proposal
in that it would create a system of ﬁling that would “assure better detection of anticompetitive arrangements
that harm consumer welfare.”305However, this proposal is subject to the same criticism as Joel Klein’s in
that it raises resource and capability issues.
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58b)
Require Parties to File Settlements with the Courts
Another potential way to provide for better regulation of patent conﬂicts between pioneer and generic
drug manufacturers would be to require all pioneer and generic drug manufacturers to ﬁle patent settlements
for approval by a court. This was the approach taken in both the consent order involving Abbott and Geneva
and the consent order involving Hoechst MRI and Andrx Corporation, which required the involved parties to
ﬁle any future patent settlements for court approval.306However, both the Abbott case and the Hoechst MRI
case involved interim settlements in the context of litigation. Any requirement that settlements obtain court
approval would also need to apply to ﬁnal settlements reached prior to litigation in order to prevent parties
from circumventing the requirement by trying to settle a case without ever ﬁling a patent infringement suit.
The downside to such a requirement, however, is that courts may be reluctant to give what would basically
amount to an advisory opinion on issues that the parties have been able to agree upon.307Also, going through
the process of court approval would add additional time and expense to the settlement process, thus reducing
some of the beneﬁts traditionally associated with settling litigation.
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59VII.
Conclusion
The entire premise behind the Hatch-Waxman Act was to encourage competition in the pharmaceutical
industry while at the same time preserving incentives to innovate. Even though the Act is not able to
perfectly balance these two goals in its current form, policymakers should be mindful not institute changes
which will disturb the balance even further. Based on this consideration, the best way to deal with the
anticompetitive issues that have arisen during the course of patent settlements is by combining several of the
proposals discussed in the previous section. Speciﬁcally, the best course for policymakers would be to elimi-
nate the 180-day exclusivity period, eliminate the thirty-month automatic stay, and require pharmaceutical
companies to ﬁle patent settlements with the antitrust authorities.
At the time the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed, policymakers assumed that the 180-day exclusivity period
was needed in order to provide incentives for generic drug companies to undertake the costly, risky pro-
cess of challenging the validity of an innovator drug company’s patents.308However, this assumption ignored
the fact that the FDA relies on the assertions of innovator drug companies with regard to the validity of
their patents.309 Given that many innovator drug companies ﬁle patents of questionable validity in order
to maintain market exclusivity, generic drug companies actually have a high probability of succeeding at
challenges to an innovator’s patents. This high probability of victory should be enough of an incentive for
generic manufacturers to challenge patents such that the 180-day exclusivity period is not really even a
needed incentive. Therefore, eliminating the 180-day rule would not have an anticompetitive eﬀect.
In fact, not only would elimination of the 180-day exclusivity rule not have an anticompetitive eﬀect, it would
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60actually be a pro-competitive move. By eliminating the rule, policymakers would take away the ability of
either an innovator or a ﬁrst ﬁler to keep other potential competitors oﬀ the market. The data clearly shows
that the more generic competitors there are in a market, the lower the amount that consumers are forced to
spend on prescription drugs.310Thus, allowing more than one competitor to enter the market immediately
following the expiration of a pioneer’s patents would result in consumer savings.
Policymakers assumed that the thirty-month automatic stay which takes eﬀect when a pioneer drug com-
pany ﬁles a patent infringement suit upon receiving a Paragraph IV certiﬁcation was necessary in order to
counterbalance the possible negative eﬀects on innovation that the shortened ANDA process might create.
Again, however, policymakers ignored the fact that pioneer drug companies might ﬁle questionable patents.
In the case of an invalid patent, the thirty-month stay actually does nothing other than prolong the harm to
competition that results from protecting products unworthy of intellectual property protection. Innovator
drug companies that actually have meritorious claims would not be harmed by elimination of the automatic
injunction because they could go to court and obtain a preliminary injunction.311The preliminary injunction
mechanism would protect incentives to innovate in the exact same way that the thirty-month automatic stay
would. Furthermore, elimination of the automatic stay would reduce the incentives that both innovators and
generics have for entering into potentially harmful anticompetitive settlements.312 Thus, competition would
be helped but not at the expense of innovation.
Because eliminating the 180-day exclusivity rule and the thirty-month automatic stay will not eliminate all
of the anticompetitive problems that often arise in patent settlements, pharmaceutical companies should also
be required to ﬁle any patent settlements with the antitrust authorities. This requirement could be imposed
by amending the Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger Notiﬁcation Act, thereby giving the FTC and the Antitrust
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61Division of the Department of Justice the power to enforce the requirement. A ﬁling requirement would
be beneﬁcial for several reasons. The knowledge that any settlement will undergo review by the antitrust
authorities should act as a deterrent to prevent parties from trying to include settlement provisions that
clearly ﬂy in the face of the antitrust laws. The ﬁling requirement would also enable antitrust authorities to
keep an eye out for other strategies that pharmaceutical companies use to exploit loopholes in the Hatch-
Waxman regulatory structure. For those strategies with questionable eﬀects on competition, the antitrust
authorities would have the opportunity to analyze the competitive risk and challenge the settlement if it is
deemed harmful to consumers.
In order to help oﬀset the costs associated with the review of these ﬁlings, parties could be required to pay
a ﬁling fee. Although the fee and the additional work involved with making the ﬁling would add costs to
the settlement process that are likely to be passed on to consumers, these costs should be somewhat oﬀset
by the beneﬁts that accrue to consumers from not having patent settlements which inhibit competition.
Regardless of what changes, if any, are made to the Hatch-Waxman Act in the coming years, it is likely
that anticompetitive issues within the pharmaceutical industry will continue to arise. Just recently, Timothy
Muris, Chairman of the FTC, testiﬁed before Congress about competition in the pharmaceutical industry,
speciﬁcally with respect to the operation of the Hatch-Waxman Act.313In his testimony he noted that the
FTC, while continuing to litigate patents settlements between pioneer drug companies and innovator drug
companies, has progressed to a “second generation” of litigation to insure vigorous competition in the
pharmaceutical industry.314This second generation of litigation involves such practices as improper listing
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62of patents in the Orange Book and settlements between two generics.315 As this new wave of litigation
demonstrates, where there are proﬁts to be had, drug companies will ﬁnd new loopholes to exploit. While
the recommendations in this paper can help eliminate some of the current abuses, they will not eliminate
the need for rigorous antitrust enforcement in the pharmaceutical industry. Ultimately, it is probably only
through this type of rigorous enforcement that the Hatch-Waxman Act’s goal of balancing incentives to
innovate with robust generic competition can be achieved.
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